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CRIMINAL COURT REFORM IN TAIWAN: A CASE OF 





Abstract:  This Article examines the character of Taiwan’s criminal court system 
and proposed court reforms.  Taiwan’s criminal court is a not-fragmented system, distinct 
from the fragmented American criminal court.  In fact, with hierarchical control in 
prosecutorial rulings and central administration of judicial decision-making, Taiwan’s 
criminal court system can be deemed a relatively centralized and bureaucratic organization.  
Given this context, when Taiwan’s criminal justice system disappoints the people, judges 
take the blame for the failures of the system.  To resolve the serious problem of public 
distrust in judges and the court system, Taiwan’s government and the judicial authority 
make “responding to expectations of the people” the ultimate goal of current court reform. 
Nonetheless, although this goal appears to be simple and intuitive, this Article argues that, 
due to its fragmented nature, this goal is not equal to its task.  This Article further argues 
that pursuing the fragmented goal of court reform in a not-fragmented system like Taiwan’s 
criminal court may very possibly lead to conflicts of important values and generate a 
counterproductive result. 
 
Cite as: Kai-Ping Su, Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan: A Case of Fragmented Reform in 
a Not-Fragmented Court System, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203 (2017). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The courts are an institution whose powers are extremely 
limited; yet they are frequently called upon to perform 
Herculean tasks.1 
 
Taiwan’s court system has faced serious problems of public distrust 
since 2010.  This crisis of confidence directly led to the resignation of the 
president of the Judicial Yuan—the head of Taiwan’s highest judicial 
authority and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court—and gave rise to 
a series of court reforms.  Among the implemented and proposed reforms, 
“lay participation” has received the most public interest.  The general idea of 
lay participation has been promoted by Taiwan’s highest judicial authority 
since 2011 and was deemed the most significant issue at the National Affairs 
Conference on Judicial Reform in 2017.2  Why is the general idea of lay 
                                                 
† Assistant Professor, Institute of Law and Government, National Central University, Taiwan.  
J.S.D, LL.M., University of California, Berkeley; LL.M., LL.B., National Taiwan University. 
1  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL xiii (1983). 
2 While the version of lay participation which Taiwan will adopt is still under discussion, the general 
idea of lay participation, that which involves ordinary citizens in trials, has been set as a default reform by 
Taiwan’s government and the highest judicial authority. Part IV and Part V of this Article have further 
discussion about this phenomenon.  
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participation so attractive that Taiwan’s judicial reform embraces it so tightly?  
Is lay participation necessary to achieve a particular goal of Taiwan’s court 
reform?  If so, what is the goal of Taiwan’s court reform?  Can this goal, if 
achieved, resolve all issues with public confidence? 
 
By examining the nature of Taiwan’s criminal court system and 
exploring the goal of Taiwan’s court reform, Part I of this Article attempts to 
answer these questions in a historical and functional context.  Part II brings to 
light the unique “reformed adversarial system” implemented in Taiwan’s 
criminal courts and introduces the four procedures that criminal court judges 
can choose when trying a case.  Under this reformed system, Taiwan’s judges 
are empowered to investigate evidence in court and dictate criminal 
proceedings.  This crucial background information provides context for the 
subsequent problem of public distrust and proposed solutions thereof.  
 
With an understanding of this issue, Part III uses Professor Malcolm M. 
Feeley’s argument, presented in his classic book “Court Reform on Trial: Why 
Simple Solutions Fail,”3 about the feature of fragmentation in the American 
criminal justice system, to further explore Taiwan’s criminal courts.  Feeley 
suggests that fragmentation is the “most visible quality of the criminal court,”4 
and further proposes that it is “the central and continuing obstacle[] to change 
in the criminal justice system.” 5   This Article uses Feeley’s analytical 
approach of the three theoretical bases —the adversary process, due process, 
and professionalism 6 —and finds that Taiwan’s criminal court is a not-
fragmented system.  Instead, many mechanisms provided by law and court 
practices in Taiwan’s court system contribute to the dominant position of 
judges in criminal trials.  These mechanisms also compel legal professionals 
involved in the system, including judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, 
to collaborate on several common objectives. 
 
Part IV introduces the serious problem of public distrust that Taiwan’s 
court system faces.  This section explains the incidents that caused the crisis 
of confidence and gave birth to the 2017 Judicial Reform Conference.  
Although other reforms have been proposed, lay participation has stood out.  
Different versions of lay participation have been vigorously and relentlessly 
supported by the judicial authority in Taiwan.  
                                                 
3 FEELEY, supra note 1. 
4 See id. at 9. 
5 See id. at 205. 
6 See id. at 11. 
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Part V discusses why the judicial authority has deemed lay participation 
the remedy for this crisis.  This Article uses two analytical structures to 
analyze this phenomenon: analysis based on stages of innovation and analysis 
based on historical and functional perspectives.  In particular, this Article 
applies Feeley’s analytical structure of innovation to Taiwan’s court reform.  
Additionally, it doubts that the problem of distrust has been diagnosed 
correctly, and it furthermore predicts the difficulty of initiation and 
implementation in carrying out the reform made by the Judicial Reform 
Conference. 
 
Part VI argues that the ultimate goal of Taiwan’s current judicial reform 
is “responding to expectations of the people.”7  Nevertheless, this Article 
holds that, even in Taiwan’s not-fragmented criminal court system, a 
fragmented goal of reform, like responding to the expectations of the people, 
has little chance of succeeding.  Due to the fragmentation inherent in this goal 
of court reform, planned changes resulting from pursuing this goal will likely 
conflict and offset each other and thus may eventually lead to a 
counterproductive result. 
 
In conclusion, borrowing Feeley’s words, this Article answers the 
question: “Why do simple solutions fail?” in Taiwan’s context.  The goal of 
responding to the expectations of the people seems like a simple, natural, and 
intuitive remedy for the crisis in public trust, but the vague and 
overgeneralized nature of this simple remedy undermines its potential to 
direct and coordinate distinct values to a successful court reform.  Ultimately, 
this Article also suggests that the predictable failure of the goal of responding 
to the expectations of the people does not necessarily foreshadow the failure 
of particular proposals such as lay participation or other planned changes.  
Each planned change may still work, but the contradictions and conflicts 




                                                 
7 While “(building a judicial system) responding to expectations of the people” was mentioned by 
Taiwan’s President Tsai In-Wen with the other two targets, “(building a judicial system) belonging to the 
people” and “being trusted by the people,” this Article argues that only “responding to expectations of the 
people” is the genuine goal of Taiwan’s court reform. More discussion about “responding to expectations of 
the people” can be found infra Section IV.C. Guanyu sifa gaige guo shi huiyi (關於司法改革國是會議) 
[About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF., 
https://justice.president.gov.tw/aboutus/3/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
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II. CHARACTERS OF TAIWAN’S CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 
 
A.  The “Reformed Adversary System”  
 
In 2002, Taiwan’s criminal justice system transformed its long-
standing inquisitorial structure, in which the court was actively involved in 
the investigation of facts and was responsible for “finding the truth,”8 into a 
so-called “reformed adversary system.”9   This new system is billed as a 
“reformed” one because it is not a typical adversarial system, where the parties 
are responsible for presenting evidence before an essentially passive and 
neutral adjudicator.10  Instead, Taiwan’s reformed adversarial system can be 
viewed as a hybrid of the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system.  Its 
hybrid nature is particularly apparent in the 2002 amendment of Article 163 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”),11 which provides: “The court 
may, for the purpose of discovering the truth, ex officio investigate evidence; 
in case for the purpose of maintaining justice or discovering facts that are 
critical to the interest of the accused, the court shall ex officio investigate 
evidence.”12  
 
Here, in the reformed adversary system, while prosecutors bear the 
burden of proof as to the crime charged, 13  judges are also authorized to 
investigate evidence in court instead of sitting back and taking a passive 
umpire role.  In addition, judges are even required to actively investigate 
evidence, specifically regarding “maintaining justice or discovering facts that 
are critical to the interest of the accused.”14  The lawmakers and advocates for 
the hybrid system expected that the aforementioned obligation would prevent 
                                                 
8 For the history and development of Taiwan’s criminal court and procedure, see Tay-sheng Wang, 
The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531, 551–54 (2002). 
9  Gai liang shi dang shi ren jin xing zhu yi yi (改良式當事人進行主義) can be translated as a 
“reformed,” “modified,” or “improved” adversary system. The first two characters “gai” (“改”) and “liang” 
(“良”) actually mean “changing” something and making it “better.” 
10 See FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 181 (1996). 
11 XING SHI SU SONG FA (刑事訴訟法 ) [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 163 (Taiwan) 
[hereinafter CRIM. PROC. CODE]. 
12 Id. art. 163, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
13 “The public prosecutor shall bear the burden of proof as to the facts of the crime charged against an 
accused, and shall indicate the method of proof.” Id. art. 161, para. 1; “The accused may indicate methods of 
proof favorable to him against the facts charged.” Id. art. 161-61. 
14 JUDICIAL YUAN (司法院), Gai liang shih dang shih ren jin sing jhu yi (改良式當事人進行主義) 
[The Reformed Adversary System], http://www.judicial.gov.tw/work/work02/work02-01.asp (last updated 
Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System] 
(emphasis added). 
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judges from slacking off and that it would involve judges in actively 
maintaining justice.  In this sense, this new court system is believed to be 
better than the pure inquisitorial or adversarial system.  Therefore, the new 
system was referred to as the “reformed” adversarial system.15 
 
Whether Taiwan’s hybrid criminal court system really functions better 
than the typical inquisitorial or adversarial systems is, of course, a matter of 
judgment.16  Those who advocate for the new system believe that the word 
“reformed” suggests expected improvement to the typical adversarial system.  
Generally speaking, Taiwan’s lawmakers are hesitant to embrace a judicial 
system where judges are passive observers and decide cases on the materials 
provided by the parties.  The concern is that if the parties fail to present 
evidence, the court will not find the truth and justice cannot be achieved.17 
 
Taiwan’s criminal court system grants judges great power and impact 
on trials, as it allows judges to actively investigate cases and discover 
evidence.  This undermines the lawmakers’ original intention of “drawing a 
clear distinction between the duties of prosecutors and those of judges, in 
order to establish the impartial status of the court.”18  The new court system 
further empowers the judges to select the criminal procedures to dispose of 
cases.  In practice, this discretionary power over court procedures dictates 
later dispositions of cases.  A deeper understanding of both the function of 
these court procedures and the role judges play in selecting the procedures 
provides an insight into why the public has placed such heavy blame on judges 
for almost all of the failures of the criminal justice system, and why lay 
participation is so strongly considered as a solution of Taiwan’s court reform 
to trial. 
 
B. Criminal Procedures and Discretionary Power of Judges 
 
    Taiwan’s CCP provides four different procedures for judges to try a 
criminal case.  The procedures are: 1) regular trial procedure, 2) simplified 
trial procedure, 3) summary procedure without trial, and 4) bargaining 
procedure. 19   Although each procedure has its own scope of application 
                                                 
15 Id.  
16 For a more thorough treatment of the success and failure, theory and practice of Taiwan’s reform 
adversary system, see, e.g., Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked 
Challenge of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’l L. 651 (2009). 
17 The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra note 14. 
18 Id. 
19 CRIM. PROC. CODE arts. 273-1, 273-2, 449, 451-1. 
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provided by the CCP (as described below), for most criminal offenses, the 
judge has great discretion in selecting the procedure.  For example, since 
regular trial procedure is the most time- and resource-consuming procedure, 
the judge has an incentive to select one of the other three procedures to handle 
a relatively minor case in order to save the court both time and resources.  
 
1. Regular Trial Procedure 
 
Among the four criminal procedures, regular trial procedure is the only 
one that is adversarial in the reformed adversarial system.  If the presiding 
judge considers it necessary, regular trial procedure can be used to try any 
criminal case, regardless of its seriousness.  For example, both murder and 
shoplifting can be tried using regular trial procedure, although the other three 
procedures can also be applied to the latter minor charge.  In a trial of regular 
procedure, defendants enjoy all constitutional and legal protections.  Among 
other things, defendants can confront and cross-examine witnesses, and 
hearsay rules also apply.  As a result, the duration of a trial using the regular 
trial procedure is usually longer than a trial using the other three procedures.  
 
2. Simplified Trial Procedure 
 
The criminal court may adopt simplified trial procedure to try a case if 
the defendant has pled guilty and the charge has a potential punishment of less 
than three years imprisonment.20  In simplified trial procedure, defendants 
willingly waive certain crucial legal protections, such as the ability to cross-
examine witnesses.21  The “simplified” feature of this proceeding is manifest 
in the court process of evidence investigation.  For example, hearsay rules do 
not apply in this simplified procedure, unless judges deem them necessary.22  
This procedure frees judges from various restrictions on evidence and 
investigation.  As a result, uncontroversial cases can be terminated quickly, 
which saves time and energy for the court and the litigants.  However, judges 
can always decide to use regular instead of simplified procedure to try cases.23 
 
 
3. Summary Procedure Without Trial 
 
                                                 
20 Id. art. 271-3, para. 1. 
21 Id. art. 273-2. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. art. 273-1, paras. 1–2. 
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Minor cases, where offenders are generally subject to punishment other 
than serving time in prison, can be handled in summary procedure.  This is a 
simpler approach than the simplified trial procedure.  In summary procedure, 
there is no public trial or any proceedings occurring in the courtroom unless 
judges deem them necessary.24  If a judge believes that a defendant is guilty 
after considering the defendant’s confession and other evidence presented, the 
court can use the summary procedure to dispose of the case without officially 
initiating a trial.  Once the decision is made, which usually occurs in a short 
period of time, the written court decision is sent to the defendant.25 
 
While summary procedure is often initiated by a prosecutor’s motion, 
judges are not restrained by the motion.  In other words, judges can decide to 
dispose of the case with regular or simplified trial procedures, even after the 
prosecutor files a motion for summary procedure without trial.26  Judges can 
also decide to use summary procedure to terminate a case, even when 
prosecutors do not request to apply summary procedure.27  As long as the 
punishment in the end is probation, community service, or a fine, it is within 
the discretion of judges to use summary procedure.28  Summary procedure has 
existed in the CCP since 1935, despite being amended several times. 
 
4. Bargaining Procedure 
 
Bargaining procedure was implemented in 2004 and is the only 
procedure that cannot be initiated based on a judge’s sole discretion.29  Rather, 
the decision to use the procedure depends on whether the parties agree and if 
the prosecutor makes a motion to the court.  When a defendant pleads guilty 
to a charge with a potential sentence of less than three years imprisonment 
and the defendant is willing to negotiate the range of sentence with 
prosecutors, the parties can begin negotiating. 30   However, unlike plea-
bargaining in the United States, Australia, and other countries, the 
negotiations are limited to sentencing ranges and do not involve potential 
charges.31  
                                                 
24 Id. art. 449. 
25 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 453, art. 455. 
26 Id. art. 449, para. 1. 
27 Id. art. 449, para. 2. 
28 Id. art. 449, para. 3. 
29 Id. art. 455-2. 
30 Id. 
31 Cf. Paul Marcus et al., A Comparative Look at Plea Bargaining in Australia, Canada, England, New 
Zealand, and the United States, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1147 (2016) (comparing plea bargaining processes 
in five common law countries and describing the roles of judges and prosecutors in each system). 
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Charges are never negotiable in Taiwan’s criminal system.  The 
agreement of sentence range, if made, must be limited to probation, less than 
two years imprisonment, or a fine.32  After the agreement has been achieved, 
the case must be brought back to court for the judges’ review.33  During the 
negotiation process, Taiwan’s prosecutors are not as powerful as American 
prosecutors. 34   In Taiwan’s bargaining procedure, negotiable ranges are 
limited, and it is judges who will make the final decision.35  If judges consider 
the agreement between the parties inappropriate, the court can reject the 
proposal and start another procedure to dispose of the case.36  If the court 
approves the agreement, the defendant will be sentenced within the range 
according to their agreement.37 
 
5. Conflicting Aims and Expectations of Taiwan’s Criminal 
Court System 
 
In summary, along with other mechanisms, Taiwan’s reformed 
adversarial system provides judges with substantial power over almost all 
aspects of criminal trials.  Judges can make decisions, actively investigate 
evidence, and select procedures to try cases.  Under these circumstances, it is 
natural that judges are expected to take a leading position in trials and also to 
take responsibility for all the legal and social effects of court decisions.  
Nonetheless, Taiwan’s judges can barely meet this expectation.  
 
There are two major interests that Taiwan’s criminal court system aims 
to address, but unfortunately, they seem to inevitably conflict.  First, the court 
system expects judges to maintain justice.  In other words, when the parties 
fail to present crucial evidence related to justice maintenance, judges are 
obliged to assume the roles of interested parties in the reformed adversarial 
system.38  At the same time, Taiwan’s reformed adversarial system also wants 
“the court [to] be deemed fair and impartial.”39  That is, Taiwan’s court 
                                                 
32 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 455-4, para. 2. 
33 Id. art. 455-2, para. 1. 
34 See Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 101 
(2016) (challenging the idea that judicial review should be limited to a marginal extent in the process of plea-
bargaining). 
35 Cf. Marcus et al., supra note 31.  
36 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 455-4, para. 1. 
37 Cf. Marcus et al., supra note 31. 
38 STRIER, supra note 10. 
39 The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra note 14 
(emphasis added). 
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system expects its judges to play the impartial role of an indifferent umpire in 
addition to the role of an interested party that actively investigates.  The two 
roles directly conflict.  
 
Alongside these conflicting roles, litigants and society expect that 
judges, equipped with seemingly immense power, can always deliver a 
“satisfying” decision to the parties and the public.40  However, this mission is 
impossible. As a result, the unreasonably designed court system paired with 
the unrealistic expectations of society puts Taiwan’s judges in a predicament.  
Consequently, the inability to meet these expectations resulted in 
dissatisfaction and disappointment with the judiciary in general, which, in 
turn, manifested in the people’s desire for court reform.  This is discussed 
further in Part IV of this Article. 
 
III. TAIWAN’S NOT-FRAGMENTED CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM 
 
This section explores Taiwan’s criminal court in light of Feeley’s 
theory, identifies the Taiwanese court systems non-fragmented features 
(including its clear characteristics of centralization and bureaucracy), and 
discusses the mechanisms contributing to its lack of fragmentation.  While the 
reformed adversarial system and other relevant mechanisms result in 
excessive expectation of Taiwan’s judges, these mechanisms also shape 
Taiwan’s criminal court system into a unique, not-fragmented system.  This 
is in contrast to the fragmentation Feeley suggests is rooted in the American 
criminal justice system and reinforced by three theoretical bases: the 
adversary process, due process, and professionalism. 41   Although the 
American and the Taiwanese criminal courts possess the same theoretical 
bases, they are different.  
 
A. The Adversary Process 
 
In the ideal form of the adversarial system, two equally strong and 
resourceful advocates compete against each other, with the aim of winning the 
case and defeating the opponent.  Through the active contest between 
adversaries, truth and the most satisfactory results are more likely to emerge.42  
Nevertheless, if parties fail to attack or counterattack, do not provide sufficient 
                                                 
40 For details, see infra Part IV.  
41 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 11. 
42 JAMES R. ACKER & DAVID C. BRODY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 444 
(2013); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53 (2003). 
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evidence, or present unconvincing points, judges in the Anglo-American 
tradition will not assume the roles of adversaries and refrain from 
investigating facts. 43   Therefore, Feeley argues, distinct agencies in the 
American justice system lack a common goal to pursue. He further elaborates:  
 
In the United States, there is no ministry of justice, no criminal 
justice czar, no one to see that everyone works together to pursue 
common objectives.  Rather, there are distinct officers—police, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges—drawn apart still further 
by the doctrine of the separation of powers and the theory of the 
adversary process.44 
 
In contrast, both the law and court practices support the idea that the 
officers of Taiwan’s criminal court—police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
and judges—apparently share common objectives.  In Taiwan’s reformed 
adversary system, these common objectives include discovering the truth, 
maintaining justice, and discovering facts that are critical to the interest of the 
accused.  For discovering the truth, according to the CCP, judges may ex 
officio investigate evidence.  For maintaining justice or discovering facts 
critical to the interest of the accused, judges shall ex officio investigate 
evidence. 45   In other words, judges are required by the law to actively 
participate in the investigation of evidence when the evidence is substantially 
related to justice or the interest of defendants.  This special legal duty of 
judges demonstrates the emphasized objectives of justice maintenance and 
protection of defendants’ rights in Taiwan’s criminal procedure. 
 
The judiciary is not the only institution required by the CCP to devote 
itself to these objectives.  According to the CCP, the police, prosecutors, and 
even defense attorneys are also involved in the pursuit of justice or finding 
truth related to rights of defendants.  As the CCP Article 2 provides: 
 
(Paragraph 1) A public official who conducts proceedings in a 
criminal case shall give equal attention to circumstances both 
favorable and unfavorable to an accused.  
 
                                                 
43 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 11–13; for a detailed discussion about the potential problems inherent 
in the adversary system, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). 
44 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
45 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 163, para. 2. 
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(Paragraph 2) An accused may request the public official 
specified in the preceding paragraph to take necessary measures 
favorable to the accused.46 
 
The police and prosecutors are so-called “public official[s]” in the 
above text of the CCP and are charged with the legal duty to take care of the 
interests of defendants.47  The police and prosecutors are not only responsible 
for arresting suspects and prosecuting defendants, but also for seeking justice 
and discovering the truth, by giving attention to the circumstances potentially 
favorable to the defendant.48  
 
On the other hand, Taiwan’s defense lawyers are required not only to 
work for the interest of defendants, but also for justice and public interest.  
While this duty of defense lawyers is not explicitly provided by the CCP,49 
court practices show that defense lawyers are expected to be an essential 
partner, along with judges, prosecutors, and all the other public officials 
involved, in pursuing justice and maximizing public interest.  The restriction 
on defendants’ self-representation in some kinds of criminal trials is an 
example of how procedural rules are developed to support the goal of justice.  
As the CCP provides, there are six kinds of criminal cases where the defendant 
must be represented by a defense attorney.  For example, there are cases where 
the minimum punishment for the charge is no less than three years 
imprisonment.50  In many cases related to the limit of self-representation, 
                                                 
46 Id. art. 2. 
47 Id.  
48 In fact, in the American adversarial justice system, prosecutors similarly do not only expect to 
single-mindedly pursue conviction, but rather must seek justice. As the United States Supreme Court clearly 
pointed out: “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is 
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
49 Cf. LU SHI FA (律師法) [ATTORNEY REGULATION ACT] art.1, para. 1–2 provides, “Attorneys take 
upon themselves the goals of promoting social justice, protecting human rights, and contributing to 
democratic government and the rule of law. Guided by these professional goals, with the spirit of self-
regulation and self-governance attorneys should strive to faithfully execute their professional responsibilities, 
contribute to the preservation of social order, and work towards the improvement of the legal system.” 
(emphasis added). 
50 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 31, para. 1 provides, “In cases where the minimum punishment is no less 
than three years imprisonment, where the High Court has jurisdiction over the first instance, or where the 
accused is unable to make a complete statement due to unsound mind, the presiding judge shall appoint a 
public defender or a lawyer to defend the accused if no defense attorney has been retained; in other cases, if 
no defense attorney has been retained by an accused with low income and a request for appointing one has 
been submitted, or if it is considered necessary, the same rule shall apply.” 
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Taiwan’s Highest Court has repeatedly explained the meaning and function 
of Taiwan’s criminal court: 
  
[I]n these kinds of cases, the option for defendants to choose to 
be represented by a defense attorney or not is limited.  [If the 
defendant does not hire a defense attorney,] [t]he state will assign 
one to the defendant, in order to carry through the defense.  By 
the expertise of the defense attorneys, it can, first of all, enhance 
the defense of the defendant . . . urge judges and prosecutors to 
give attention to the circumstance favorable to the defendant, as 
provided by the CCP Article 2.  Furthermore, it will fill the gap 
between the governmental power and the capability of the 
defendant, make sure that the parties are substantively equal, so 
as to . . . pursue the maximization of the judicial benefit.51 
 
From the opinion expressed above, we can clearly see that defense 
attorneys are also deemed an integral component of Taiwan’s criminal court 
system, which functions to maximize the public interest.  Therefore, instead 
of being a fragmented system, Taiwan’s criminal court system is theoretically 
and practically expected to be an integrated system where judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and other officials should collaborate with each other to 
achieve certain common objectives, including the finding of truth, the 
maintenance of justice, and the protection of defendants’ rights. 
 
B. Due Process 
 
Feeley also holds that the fear-of-authority nature of due process leads 
to separated functions, fragmented authority, and circumscribed power. 52  
Hence, the power of the state is diminished by the insulation of the judiciary, 
meaning that the judiciary is presumably an independent branch of the 
government and is not affected by officials of the executive power.  Many 
rules of criminal procedure are designed more to restrain officials than to 
accurately determine if the defendant committed the crime.  Feeley also 
suggests that the formalism of American criminal procedure grants “vast 
discretion at each of several critical stages,” which fosters plea-bargaining in 
practice and facilitates fragmentation.53 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Tsui Kao Fa Yuen 103 Nien Du Tai Shang Tzu Ti 3150 Hao Pan Jue Jue (最高法院 103
年度台上字第 3150號判決) [The Highest Court 2014 Tai Appeal No. 3150 Decision].  
52 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 13–15. 
53 Id. 
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While due process is also one of the defining characteristics of 
Taiwan’s Constitution and criminal procedure,54 it does not appear to create 
fragmented authority or separate functions in Taiwan’s criminal court 
system. 55   Although it is true that Taiwan’s prosecutors, judges, defense 
attorneys, and other agencies involved in the court system have their own 
power to exercise and duties to fulfill, these agencies still collaborate to pursue 
common objectives, as analyzed in the last section.  In this sense, Taiwan’s 
criminal court is neither a fragmented system nor an interdependent system.  
Instead, it is a system where different agencies are legally and practically 
obligated to integrate into one.56 
 
An example of this collaborative feature of Taiwan’s criminal justice 
system is the restraint on prosecutors’ discretion.  The power and function of 
Taiwan’s prosecutors are quite different from those of American prosecutors.  
American prosecutors, in Feeley’s words, “have virtually unlimited and 
unreviewable discretion in setting charges and in deciding whether or not to 
prosecute at all.”57  In Professor Franklin E. Zimring’s words, prosecutors are 
“the all-powerful 500-pound gorilla in criminal justice.” 58   American 
prosecutors have almost exclusive authority regarding decisions about 
whether to file criminal charges, when charges should be brought, what 
charges to file, and whom the charges should be brought against.  Most 
importantly, these prosecutorial decisions are not subject to judicial review.59 
 
                                                 
54 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA (中華民國憲法) [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 8, 
para. 1 (2000) (Taiwan) provides, “Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. Except in case of 
flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise than by a judicial or a 
police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished 
otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, 
trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted.” 
(emphasis added). 
55 It is also noteworthy that due process is actually universal in almost all free nations. See RONALD J. 
ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81 (3d ed. 2011) (“The idea of due process probably 
underlies the law of criminal procedure in all free societies.”). 
56 Some scholars distinguish “an interdependent criminal justice system” from “a fragmented criminal 
justice non-system.” See, e.g., DAVID W. NEUBAUER & HENRY F. FRADELLA, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7–8 (2015). However, unlike the “interdependent system,” in which different 
agencies are interdependent with, and interrelated to, each other to achieve their individual goals, Taiwan’s 
agencies of the criminal court system work together towards certain identical, common goals. 
57 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 14. 
58 Franklin E. Zimring, False Premise of Gun Sentences, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1N1-149791FB586BF7E8.html?refid=easy_hf. 
59 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 55, at 961. 
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In contrast, Taiwan’s prosecutors are required to make decisions (called 
“rulings”) on cases assigned to them within a limited period of time. 60  
According to the internal administrative rules granted by the Ministry of 
Justice, the due period for completing the investigation of a general criminal 
case is eight months, but for cases of “major criminal offenses,” prosecutors 
have only four months to make rulings.61  If prosecutors fail to close a case 
within the time limits, they will be urged, admonished, and even punished by 
the chief prosecutor or the Ministry of Justice.62  
 
Furthermore, all of the prosecutorial rulings come with corresponding 
judicial review or prosecutorial supervision.  For example, if the prosecutor 
chooses to prosecute a case, the case is then subject to the court’s review.  
When the prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, or to defer the 
prosecution, the complainants (usually victims or their family) can petition to 
the chief prosecutor of the higher level prosecutors’ office for 
“reconsideration” of the original ruling.  The chief prosecutor has the authority 
to set aside the original ruling and send the case back for further investigation 
or command the prosecutor to bring a charge.63  If the chief prosecutor affirms 
the original ruling of deferred or non-prosecution, the complainant has the 
legal right to submit his or her case to a court for setting the case for trial.64  
Additionally, the court can eventually intervene to review the prosecutor’s 
rulings of deferred or non-prosecution. 
 
Similarly, the discretionary power possessed by American prosecutors 
over plea-bargaining is substantially limited for their counterparts in Taiwan.  
First, in Taiwan’s bargaining procedure, charges are non-negotiable.  The 
negotiation between parties can only involve sentences.  Second, only 
relatively minor offenses are negotiable.65  Those offenses that are subject to 
capital punishment, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for more than three 
                                                 
60 Id. at 1055. (“Generally, [American] law enforcement and prosecutors can investigate as long as 
necessary and bring criminal charges anytime, provided they don’t run afoul of the applicable statute of 
limitations.”). 
61 Guidelines, Ministry of Justice, Jian cha ji guan ban an qi xian ji fang zhi ji yan shi shi yao dian (檢
察機關辦案期限及防止稽延實施要點) [Directions for Time Limits for Handling Cases and Prevention 
from Procrastination for the Prosecutors’ Offices], art. 35, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=C0000001. More serious crimes require less time 
because society worries more over serious offenses. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice asks prosecutors to 
deal with these cases more quickly. 
62 Id. arts. 40, 44, 45, 46. 
63 Id. art. 258. 
64 Id. arts. 258-1, 258-2, 258-3. 
65 Id. art. 455-2. 
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years are excluded from the bargaining procedure.66  Most importantly, as in 
other procedures, judges play a crucial role in the bargaining procedure.  
Among the four criminal court procedures, bargaining procedure is the only 
one that the court cannot initiate by itself.  The CCP authorizes the prosecutor 
to initiate the bargaining procedure.67  However, before the parties can begin 
their negotiation, the bargaining procedure has to be approved by the court.68  
After the parties reach an agreement, the court is responsible for reviewing 
the agreement to determine whether anything “is obviously inappropriate or 
unfair” and whether the agreement is reached in accordance with law before 
making the final decision.69  In this sense, it is still the court making the 
decision.  The agreement between parties is merely a proposal submitted to 
the court for its consideration, and the negotiations never limit the discretion 
of the court. 
 
As such, the two most fundamental powers of prosecutors in the 
American criminal justice system— the vast discretion in prosecution and the 
decision to drop or reduce charges in plea bargaining—are heavily restricted 
by Taiwan’s courts and the Ministry of Justice.  Taiwan’s prosecutors are 
considered components of both a highly centralized prosecutorial system, in 
which the authority is the Ministry of Justice,70 and of the criminal justice 
                                                 
66 Id.  
67 Id. art. 455-2, para. 1 (“Except for those who have committed an offense which is punishable for 
sentence of capital punishment, life imprisonment, sentence more than three years, or is adjudicated by the 
court of appeal as the court of first instance, once a case has been prosecuted by a prosecutor or applied for 
a summary judgment, after consulting with the victim’s opinion the prosecutor may, before the close of oral 
arguments in the court of first instance or before the summary judgment, act on his/her own discretion or 
upon requests by the defendant, his/her agent or attorney, which has been approved by the court, to negotiate 
the following items outside the trial procedure . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. art. 455-4. (There are seven circumstances provided by art. 455-4, para. 1, under which the court 
“may not pronounce a bargaining judgement”:  
“1. Where the agreement is withdrawn or where requests for bargaining is revoked pursuant 
Paragraph 2 of the preceding article; 
2. Where the bargain was not made out of defendant’s free will; 
3. Where the bargaining agreement is obviously inappropriate or unfair; 
4. Where defendant’s offence may not be subject to a bargaining judgment pursuant to Paragraph 
1 of Article 455-2; 
5. Where facts established by the court are different from facts agreed in the bargaining process; 
6. Where a defendant commits other counts of offense which were arose by the same act in trial 
with heavier punishments; 
7. Where the court deems proper to pronounce punishment remitted, exemption from prosecution, 
or case dismissed.” (emphasis added). 
70 See Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle to Guide 
the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 654–59 (2005) (discussing the 
problems of a decentralized American prosecutorial system and calling for a directive principle to guide the 
exercise of discretion by American prosecutors). 
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system, where the court substantially restrains the power of the prosecutor.  In 
their daily practice, prosecutors have to carry out the policy goals of the 
Ministry of Justice and collaborate with the court to achieve the common 
objectives of the court system.  Taiwan’s prosecutors are more like a 
significant piece of the entire picture of the criminal justice system than like 




1. Frequent Appellate Court Reviews 
 
In Feeley’s opinion, American courts are disorganized because they are 
dominated by professionalism, in which “professional norms foster 
independence of judgment and autonomy.”71  In addition, Feeley also argues 
that American criminal courts are only superficially organized into a 
hierarchical, bureaucratic-like structure.  In fact, while appellate courts in the 
United States are able to supervise the quality of work in lower courts, this 
supervision is passive, expensive, and used infrequently.72 
 
Taiwan’s criminal court system has more frequent higher court 
supervision than the American system.  First, both defendants and prosecutors 
have the right to appeal; the protection of double jeopardy in Taiwan does not 
prohibit the prosecutor from appealing a not-guilty decision.73  That is, the 
appellate courts may take separate appeals from both the prosecutor and the 
defendant.  In so doing, appellate courts have more chances to review the 
decisions of lower courts.  Second, the right to appeal to the Highest Court for 
a second review is almost absolute.  That is, other than some relatively minor 
offenses, such as offenses with a maximum punishment of no more than three 
years, all other criminal cases are allowed by law to be appealed to the Highest 
Court.74  Therefore, decisions of district courts are not the only decisions that 
are reviewed.  Decisions of High Courts are frequently reviewed and 
supervised by the Highest Court.  Third, reversal rates for appeals are not 
low.75  From 2010 to 2015, the reversal rates of district court decisions was 
                                                 
71 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 15. 
72 Id. 
73 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 344 (“A party who disagrees with the judgment of a lower court may appeal 
to the appellate court.” Thus, both defendants and prosecutors can appeal to the appellate court). 
74 Id. arts. 375–76. 
75 Cf. Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/news/2016 /12/20/just-facts-us-courts-appeals# table2 (from 2011–2015, the United States 
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27% on average, whereas the reversal rates of High Court decisions was 
12%.76  In summary, compared with the American criminal court system 
where prosecutors cannot appeal a not-guilty decision and usually only one-
time appellate review from a higher court is allowed,77 Taiwan’s criminal 
court system is designed to permit higher chances of supervision from the 
higher courts.  Thus, in Taiwan’s system, while deference to professional 
judgment is still the norm, the professionalism is relatively restricted and 
subject to more supervision. 
 
2. Pan Li and Jue Yi 
 
In addition, Taiwan’s legal precedents (“Pan li”) and resolutions (“Jue 
yi”) are mechanisms that contribute to the compromise of professionalism, as 
these limit the discretionary power of judges in deciding cases.  Unlike in the 
common law system, court decisions on individual cases are not considered 
to be a source of law in Taiwan.78  Nor does a previous court decision have 
legal effect in future cases.  However, Taiwan’s Pan li system has legal effect 
similar to precedent in the American system, but works in a more bureaucratic 
way.  
 
In order to unify the legal opinions of courts, Taiwan’s Highest Court 
holds judicial conferences to select past decisions of the Highest Court to 
become Pan li, namely “precedents of courts.”79  These judicial conferences 
are composed of the Highest Court judges, and are usually held ten to twenty 
times per year.  Pan li does not include the entire text of past court decisions; 
instead, short paragraphs are included that refer to crucial legal principles 
excerpted from the original court decisions.  In this way, Pan li can be applied 
to future court cases with distinct facts with similar legal principles. 
 
Other than Pan li, the judicial conference also frequently makes Jue yi, 
which literally means the resolution of the judicial conference.  Jue yi is a 
clear-cut answer to specific legal issues faced by courts.  The lower courts 
                                                 
Courts of Appeals reverse rates (appeals resulted in reversals of lower court decisions) for criminal cases 
were less than seven percent). 
76 See JUDICIAL YUAN (司法院), 司法統計年報 [JUDICIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK] (2010–2015), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/goa/goa 02.htm.  
77 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 55, at 1565–66. 
78 WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 39–
40 (4th ed. 2006). 
79 FA YUAN ZU ZHI FA (法院組織法) [COURT ORGANIZATION ACT] art. 57 (about the process of setting 
up or changing a Pan li). 
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may periodically have different legal opinions on the same issues, and they 
can submit their opinions or inquiries to the judicial conference of the Highest 
Court.  In the judicial conference, all the opinions are listed for the reference 
of conference members, and the members decide by vote which opinion is 
more appropriate for solving the issue.  Compared with Pan li, which is an 
excerpt of abstract legal principles from past court decisions, Jue yi is a more 
specific and concrete process targeting the practical issues currently before 
judges.  
 
Both Pan li and Jue yi have a legal effect that is deemed equivalent to 
legal regulations. 80   By restricting the professional judgment of criminal 
courts, enhancing the consistency between court decisions, and creating a 
clearer standard for higher courts to review decisions of lower courts, Pan li 
and Jue yi have shaped Taiwan’s criminal courts into an organization which 
has more apparent bureaucratic features than those of the American courts.  
 
In summary, where Feeley concluded that the American criminal court 
has become fragmented “in its organization, its operations, and its goals,” 
through its theoretical bases in the adversary process, due process, and 
professionalism, Taiwan’s criminal justice system reveals a different 
structure. 81   However, when Taiwan’s criminal justice system is viewed 
through the same three theoretical bases, a different structure emerges.  
Through the operation of the “reformed adversary system,” Taiwan’s criminal 
court emphasizes cooperation more than contest.  Theoretically, the court, the 
prosecutor, and the defense attorney are aligned to seek several common 
objectives, such as maintenance of justice and discovery of the truth.  
Furthermore, despite the deference to professional judgment, the discretionary 
power of prosecutors is checked by the court, as well as by a highly centralized 
prosecutorial system in which the Ministry of Justice has the highest authority.  
Taiwan’s criminal courts are also subject to more frequent appellate reviews 
and general instructional opinions like Pan li or Jue yi from the Highest Court.  
Hence, compared to its American counterpart, Taiwan’s criminal court system 
is less fragmented and all of the agencies therein are set up to pursue certain 
                                                 
80 J.Y. Interpretation No. 374 (司法院大法官釋字第 374 號解釋) (Const. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=374 (“Due to the fact that [Pan li and 
Jue yi] are made according to law (See Article 78 of the Law of Court Organization and Article 32 of the 
Regulations Governing the Operational Procedures of the [Highest] Court) and represent the legal opinions 
of the [Highest] Court, they shall be deemed equivalent to the regulations mentioned above if they are 
invoked by judges in judgments, and thus subject to review by this Council once the people make petition 
for interpretation.”). 
81 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 9. 
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common goals.  In this sense, Taiwan’s criminal courts seem to avoid the 
potential hindrance to court reform that results from the fragmented nature of 
the adversary system.82 
 
Despite its lack of fragmentation, over the last two decades Taiwan’s 
criminal court system has endured severe criticism and a crisis of confidence.  
Ironically, the problem of distrust that Taiwan’s courts are facing quite 
possibly resulted from those mechanisms that contribute to Taiwan’s not-
fragmented court system.  The next part of this Article will discuss the crisis 
of confidence, analyze the causes, and examine a proposed solution to the 
problem: lay participation. 
 
IV.   CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AND COURT REFORM IN TAIWAN 
 
A. “White Rose Movement” 
 
Due to several judicial corruption scandals and a few widely criticized 
court decisions, Taiwan’s criminal court system faces its most severe crisis of 
confidence since the reformed adversarial system was implemented in 2002.83  
In 2010, three senior High Court judges and one prosecutor were charged with 
corruption.  The judges were accused of taking bribes to fix the outcome of a 
criminal case, where a former legislator was on trial for corruption. 84  
Unfortunately, this scandal confirmed the long held rumors of corruption 
among Taiwan’s judiciary and led to the resignations of both the president of 
the Judicial Yuan (Taiwan’s highest authority) and the head of the High 
Court.85  These scandals brought public outrage to a boiling point. 
 
                                                 
82 Id. at 31 (“First, the fragmentation and seeming inefficiencies of the courts are inherent in the very 
theory and structure of the adversary process and are not simply the result of aberration, overload, or 
inadequate personnel.”); see also PAUL B. WICE, COURT REFORM AND JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP: JUDGE GEORGE 
NICOLA AND THE NEW JERSEY JUSTICE SYSTEM 18–20 (1995) (“The first problem grows out of the adversarial 
nature of the American legal system and has resulted in its highly fragmented structure.”). 
83 Wendy Zeldin, Global Legal Monitor Taiwan: Law on Removal of Judges Adopted, But Dinosaur 
Judges Might Not Become Extinct, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/taiwan-law-on-removal-of-judges-adopted-but- 
dinosaur-judges-might-not-become-extinct/ (“The [Judges] Act’s passage comes in the midst of public 
concern over a series of judgments that fell short of the expected outcomes and after a number of cases of 
judicial corruption, particularly in connection with High Court judges.”). 
84 Cindy Sui, Taiwan Judges on Corruption Charges, BBC NEWS, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-asia-pacific-11711199 (three judges were sentenced to imprisonment of up to 20 years for 
corruption in 2013); see Taiwan Judges Sentenced for Corruption, TAIWAN NEWS, Oct. 17, 2013, 
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2324367. 
85 Ko Shu-ling, Ma Accepts Lai In-jaw’s Resignation, TAIPEI TIMES, July 19, 2010, 
http://www.taipeitimes. com/News/front/archives/2010/07/19/2003478271. 
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Moreover, in 2010, several controversial court decisions on child 
sexual assault cases were profoundly criticized for excessive leniency.  These 
cases include decisions made by every level of court, including the district 
courts, the High Courts, and the Highest Court.86  For example, in a child rape 
case, the Highest Court found that the prosecutor failed to prove the accused 
had been “acting against the will” of the victim, who was a six-year-old girl.87  
In another case, the victim of a sexual molestation was a two-year-old boy.  
The offender was sentenced to nine months in prison, but ultimately did not 
serve any time in prison; his punishment was suspended and replaced with 
probation for two years.88  In addition to the victims’ families, the public was 
outraged by these court decisions.  The public and media harshly attacked the 
court for asking for proof of a six-year-old girl’s expression of unwillingness 
to have intercourse with an adult. 89  Taiwan’s judges were broadly criticized 
for living in an ivory tower and being out of touch with public concerns.90  
 
The outrage of the public, resulting from both corruption scandals and 
controversial court decisions, led to social movements seeking judicial 
reform.  More than 300,000 people signed a petition requesting to remove 
“unqualified” judges.91  Mass dissatisfaction with criminal courts also sparked 
several large-scale demonstrations.  Among them, the “White Rose 
Movement,” held on September 25, 2010, was the largest protest march in 
more than a decade.  Fifteen thousand people participated in the protest march, 
asking for amendment of the law and removal of unqualified judges.92  
                                                 
86 See Xu Wei-qun, Cong bai mei gui yun dong tan si fa gai ge (從白玫瑰運動談司法改革) 
[Discussion on Judicial Reform from the Perspective of “White Rose Movement”], 15(4) TAIWAN B.J. 15 
(2011) (discussing why the White Rose Movement could force the judiciary to reform). 
87 Zuigao Fayuan 99 Nien Du Tai Shang Tzu Ti 4894 Hao Pan Jue (最高法院 99年度台上字第 4894
號判決) [The Highest Court 2010 Tai Appeal No. 4894 Decision]. A further analysis of this case and an 
introduction to the elements of rape in Taiwan’s Criminal Code can be found infa Section V.B.a. 
88 The case number is not disclosed to the public. See Xu, supra note 86. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Taiwan News Quick Take, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/ 
taiwan/archives/2010/09/25/2003483723 (“After having collected more than 300,000 signatures, several 
organizations behind the “‘White Rose Movement’” will stage a demonstration on Ketagalan Boulevard in 
front of the Presidential Office starting at 6pm tonight to voice their demands to the government. The White 
Rose Movement calls for the elimination of judges they consider unsuitable and for a revision to law to 
provide better protection against sexual assault for children and people with disabilities. The move was first 
initiated by Internet users who were upset about a court verdict last month that gave a man accused of 
molesting a six-year-old girl a three-year prison sentence, based on the explanation that the girl did not 
explicitly express objection.”). 
92 Bao hu hai zi gan zou lan fa guan—bai mei gui yun dong kong su qing pan se lang (保護孩子趕走
爛法官—白玫瑰運動控訴輕判色狼 ) [Protect Children, Remove Unqualified Judges—“White Rose 
Movement” Accusing Court for Leniently Treating Satyrs], PING GUO RI BAO (蘋果日報) [APPLE DAILY], 
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People also started to lash out at judges, calling them “dinosaur 
judges.” 93   Allegedly, there are two reasons that judges were called 
“dinosaurs.”  First, people criticized these judges for having antiquated 
thoughts from the time of the dinosaurs.  Second, people analogized judges to 
dinosaurs, which have immense power but act slowly.94  The public also 
started using another degrading title: “baby judges.”  This term is used to refer 
to young, unqualified judges who lack the social experiences necessary to 
make a sympathetic and satisfying decision.95  
 
The “White Rose Movement” profoundly contributed to the general 
consensus of society that Taiwan’s courts urgently needed reform. 96   In 
response, the judicial authority initiated multiple reforms for criminal 
procedures.97  Nonetheless, these reforms, even when implemented, did not 
appear to solve the problem of public distrust.  The figure below shows the 
serious crisis of confidence that Taiwan’s courts face.98   The trend lines 
indicate that the majority of people in Taiwan do not trust judges and 
prosecutors, especially the former, and that this distrust is growing.  
 
                                                 
Sept. 26, 2010, http://www.appledaily. 
com.tw/appledaily/article/ headline/20100926/32841220. 
93 Liu Kong Zhong, Ping heng le kong long yu bai mei gui (平衡了恐龍與白玫瑰) [Balance Between 
“Dinosaurs” and “White Rose”], ZHONG GUO SHI BAO (中國時報) [CHINA TIMES], July 28, 2011. 
94 Ye Jun-rong, Kong long fa guan yu kong long fa xue (恐龍法官與恐龍法學) [“Dinosaur” Judges 
and “Dinosaur” Jurisprudence], 164 TAIWAN L.J., 41–43 (2010). 
95 Lin Meng-huang, Fa guan jiao se fa guan xuan ren yu fa lü ren lun li—cong wa wa fa guan nai zui 
fa guan zhi yi sheng lang tan qi (法官角色、法官選任與法律人倫理—從娃娃法官、奶嘴法官質疑聲浪
談起) [Role of Judges, Selection of Judges, and Legal Ethics— Discussion from the Inquiries about “Baby 
Judges” and “Pacifier Judges”], 277 TAIWAN L.J. 27, 27–41 (2010). 
96 Xu, supra note 86. 
97 After the White Rose Movement, the CCP was amended ten times, and sixty-six articles were 
amended or added. 
98 國立中正大學被害調查  [NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, 
ANNUAL NATIONWIDE SURVEY ON VICTIMS AND EXTENT OF SATISFACTION ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, 
2008–2015], http://deptcrc.ccu.edu.tw/examine/showExamineList (last visited Apr. 15, 2017) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER]. 
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Figure I: Taiwan’s People Distrust in Judges’ Fairness99  
 
Considering the fact that the efforts made by the judicial system were 
attempting to improve people’s confidence in criminal courts, these results 
demonstrate that the efforts appear to have been made in vain.  However, 
among all the reforms proposed, there is one major reform proposal which has 
never been passed into law, but has been vigorously and relentlessly supported 
by the judicial authority: lay participation. 
 
B. Lay Participation Proposal of “Guan Shen Zhi” 
 
According to the Judicial Yuan, lay participation is not foreign to 
Taiwan’s legal tradition. 100  From 1987 to 2007, the Judicial Yuan drafted 
three versions of lay participation proposals, but none were successfully 
passed into law.101  In January 2011, three months after the “White Rose 
Movement,” the new president of the Judicial Yuan assumed office and 
immediately started promoting an innovative version of lay participation, 
“Guan shen zhi.”  
 
The “Guan shen zhi” is different from all the previous proposed 
versions of lay participation, which referred to either Germany or Japan, and 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Si fa yuan guo min can yu xing shi shen pan zhi tui dong ji xuan dao, guo min san yi zing shi shen 
pan wang zhan (司法院國民參與刑事審判之推動及宣導, 國民參與刑事審判網站) [The Promotion and 
Announcement of the Judicial Yuan for Lay Participation in Criminal Trials], 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/LayParticipation/intro08.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Lay 
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can be considered a completely new innovation in lay participation.102  “Guan 
shen zhi” literally means “a system where trials can be observed.” 103  
According to the rules drafted and proposed by the Judicial Yuan in January 
2012, 104  laymen are allowed to sit with judges through the trial, to ask 
questions about evidence investigation, and to express opinions while judges 
make decisions.105  However, they are not lay “judges.”  In “Guan shen zhi,” 
laymen are not allowed to vote on court decisions,106nor are professional 
judges limited by the opinions of laymen while making court decisions.107  
From the close timing of the social movement and the initiation of innovative 
reform, the intention of the judicial authority for pushing the “Guan shen zhi” 
is clear. 
 
Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan had firmly upheld “Guan shen zhi” from 2011 
to 2016.  Despite the strong support from the authority, the innovation had not 
been passed into law.  In November 2016, the president and vice president of 
the Judicial Yuan supporting “Guan shen zhi” stepped down.  The new and 
current president of the Judicial Yuan declared that promotion of lay 
participation will be one of his major judicial reform objectives, but he will 
promote another type of lay participation, not “Guan shen zhi.”108  At the same 
time, the president also said that the National Affairs Conference on Judicial 
Reform (“the Judicial Reform Conference” or “the Conference”) would 
                                                 
102  The Judicial Yuan officially translated the system of “Guan shen zhi” (觀審制) as the “Advisory 
Jury System.” See Proposal, Judicial Yuan (司法院), Statute on the Pilot Implementation of the Advisory 
Jury System in Trial (Draft), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/LayParticipation/law.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) 
[hereinafter Taiwan’s “Guan shen zhi” Proposal of Judicial Yuan]. 
103 Therefore, a scholar translated “Guan shen zhi” as “Lay Observer System.” See Yi- Lou, 
Establishing a Suitable Lay Participation System for the Taiwanese Criminal Justice System 201 (Nov. 2014) 
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Indiana University Maurer School of Law) (on file with Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law Library system). 
104 Taiwan’s “Guan shen zhi” Proposal of Judicial Yuan, supra note 102. 
105 Id. arts. 8, 52, 56. 
106 For lay participation in Japan, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in 
Japan: The Saiban-in System and Victim Participation in Japan in International Perspectives, 42 INT’L J.L. 
CRIME & JUST. 71 (2014); for lay participation in South Korea, see Jae-Hyup Lee, Getting Citizens Involved: 
Civil Participation in Judicial Decision-Making in Korea, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 177 (2009). 
107 Taiwan’s “Guan shen zhi” Proposal of Judicial Yuan, supra note 102, art. 59, para. 1 (“The judges’ 
deliberation on the finding of facts, application of laws and the sentence to be imposed shall be decided by 
the majority and need not be bound by the Advisory Jurors’ opinions.”). 
108 Xu Zong-li (許宗力), 對司法改革與大法官再任問題的看法 [Thoughts on Judiciary Reforms and 
Problems With Serving As the Grand Justice Again], 新 頭 殼  [NEWTALK], Sept. 1, 2016, 
http://newtalk.tw/news/view/2016-09-01/76838. 
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decide the new system of lay participation.  The Conference concluded in 
August 2017.109  
 
C. National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform 
 
The Conference, which was launched by Taiwan’s President Tsai In-
Wen in 2016,110 targeted “building a judicial system belonging to people, 
responding to the expectations of the people, and being trusted by people.”111  
The Conference was composed of five divisions and scheduled to discuss 
twenty-one comprehensive issues related to judicial reform. 112   The 
committee members include the president of the Judicial Yuan, a former 
justice of the Constitutional Court, the Minister of Justice, the head of 
Taiwan’s Highest Court, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, NGO representatives, 
journalists, medical experts, writers, ex-convicts, a victim’s family member, 
a correctional officer, and scholars in a range of topics, including law, 
economics, sociology, social work, philosophy, psychology, public health, 
and journalism.113  According to the directions for the Conference, more than 
half of the 101 committee members are laymen, who are not involved with 
the legal profession. 114   It is clear from the diverse backgrounds and 
composition of its members that the Judicial Reform Conference intends to 
collect thoughts from both legal and non-legal perspectives so that the 
proposed reform will respond to the expectations of the people. 115   The 
consensus reached in the Conference will be passed on to Taiwan’s 
government and the Judicial Yuan for reference when making future judicial 
policies.  As for lay participation, the Conference has conducted several 
                                                 
109 ZONG TONG FU SI FA GAIGE GUO SHI HUI YI (總統府司法改革國是會議) [THE NAT’L AFFAIRS 
CONF. ON JUDICIAL REFORM, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT], https://justice.president.gov.tw/ (last visited Apr. 20, 
2017) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REFORM CONFERENCE HOMEPAGE]. 
110 President Tsai Launches Judicial Reform in Taiwan, TAIWAN TODAY, July 12, 2016, 
http://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=3923. 
111 About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7. 
112  Zong tong fu si fa gaige guo shi hui yi chou bei yuan hui di si ci chou bei wei yuan hui yi (「總統
府 司 法 改 革 國 是 會 議 籌 備 委 員 會 」 
第四次籌備委員會議 ) [The Fourth Preparation Committee for the Presidential National Affairs 
Conference on Judicial Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF., 
https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/23 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
113 司改國是會議 分組委員名單曝光 [The Member List of the Judicial Reform Conference], 自由時
報 [LIBERTY TIMES], Feb. 17, 2017, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1978579. 
114 Id. 
115 See About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7. 
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discussions about the versions possibly being adopted, but has not yet reached 
a consensus.116 
 
V.   ANALYSIS: IS LAY PARTICIPATION THE REMEDY?  
 
Lay participation is widely considered the definite court reform and is 
therefore worth preliminary analysis.  In his book “Court Reform on Trial: 
Why Simple Solutions Fail,” Feeley delineates five stages of innovative court 
reform—diagnosis, initiation, implementation, routinization, and 
evaluation—and indicates each stage has its individual pitfalls.117  Briefly, 
diagnosis (or conception) is the process of identifying problems and 
considering solutions.  Initiation adds new functions or alters existing 
practices.  Implementation translates abstract goals into practical practices.  
Routinization indicates how an innovation performs over a longer period and 
involves the persistent support from an institution for the innovation.  
Evaluation is the assessment of new programs, including the assessment of 
their experimental stages (diagnosis, initiation, and implementation) as well 
as the routine periods (routinization).118  Borrowing this analytical structure, 
this section analyzes the first three stages of Taiwan’s lay participation 
proposal to probe into the nature of this innovation in court reform.  Feeley 
also argues, “[f]ocusing on the shortcomings of a single practice without 
placing it in historical and functional context usually leads to gross distortion 
and exaggeration.”119  To avoid gross distortion and exaggeration, and to 
further develop an understanding of lay participation as a recipe for success, 









                                                 
116 The manuscript of this Article was completed on May 4, 2017, and the last day for division 
discussion of the Conference was May 21, 2017. Thus, it is hard to tell if lay participation will become part 
of the Conference conclusions. See JUDICIAL REFORM CONFERENCE HOMEPAGE, supra note 109 (containing 
the conference schedule).  
117 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 35–37. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at xiii. 
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Diagnosis is the first and most crucial step of innovation.  As Feeley 
stated, diagnosis is “the process of identifying problems and considering 
solutions.” 120   Further, “[d]ifferent perspectives lead people to identify 
different problems and suggests different remedies.” 121   Incorrect or 
inaccurate diagnosis, therefore, may lead to misidentification of the nature of 
problems and produce flawed remedies for these problems.  Taiwan’s court 
reforms may be an example of inaccurate diagnosis.  Faced with the immense 
crisis of confidence in the courts, Taiwan’s judicial authority has tried many 
approaches to tackling the problem, but all its attempts from 2010 to 2016 
failed to win back the public trust.  As a result, the judicial reform launched 
in 2016 diagnosed the problem as the generalized disappointment with the 
judiciary as a whole.122  
 
However, it is questionable whether this diagnosis is accurate or 
correct.  For starters, this diagnosis is not clear enough to tell us why the 
disappointment has been so generalized and undiminished in the last seven 
years.  The origin of the disappointment and distrust was the corruption 
scandal of judges and a few controversial court decisions, as discussed earlier.  
Nevertheless, even after the corrupt judges were sentenced, and the CCP was 
heavily amended—ten times in seven years—the situation has not improved.  
Instead, the annual nationwide survey of public opinions shows that the 
people appear to distrust Taiwan’s court system even more as time goes by.123  
 
The simple diagnosis of “generalized disappointment with the 
judiciary,”124 therefore, does not probe into the causes of the long-lasting 
problem of distrust in Taiwan.  The authority has not further considered the 
mechanisms that keep enlarging the gap between the judiciary and the people 
after the “White Rose Movement.”  Nor has the authority clarified if 
expectations of the people about what the court can do are reasonable.  
Instead, to resolve this generalized problem, the government and the judicial 
authority conceived of an equally generalized idea of “responding to 
                                                 
120 Id. at 35–36. 
121 Id. at 36. 
122 Zong tong fu si fa gai ge guo shi hui yi chou bei wei yuan hui di yi ci chou bei wei yuan hui yi chou 
bei wei yuan fa yan jiyao ( 「 總 統 府 司 法 改 革 國 是 會 議 籌 備 委 員 會 」 第 一 
次籌備委員會議籌備委員發言紀要 ) [The First Preparation Committee for the Presidential National 
Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF., 
https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/4 (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
123 See NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 98, Figure I 
(“Taiwan’s People Distrust in Judges’ Fairness”). 
124 The First Preparation Committee for the Presidential National Affairs Conference on Judicial 
Reform, supra note 122. 
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expectations of the people.”125  Nevertheless, responding to the expectations 
of the people is more appropriate as a political slogan, as opposed to as a 
method for taking actions to address specific problems.  This unclear and non-
directive policy goal cannot substantively contribute to court reform and will 
create inevitable conflicts between reform proposals, as this Article will 
discuss in Part VI.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the new president of the Judicial Yuan seemed 
to change his opinions after Taiwan’s legislators approved his nomination.  
On September 1, 2016, before his nomination was confirmed, the then-
presidential nominee addressed four major issues of court reform, the first of 
which was to “clarify the causes of the public distrust.”126  At this time, the 
then-nominee stated that “the reason to launch the National Affairs 
Conference on Judicial Reform is that people distrust the judicial system.  
Therefore, we are thinking about how to tackle this problem.  The preeminent 
issue is to clarify the causes of the public distrust of the judicial system.”127  
 
Interestingly, on October 25, 2016, when the nomination was 
successfully confirmed, the statement of the president-to-be did not mention 
the need to “clarify the causes of the public distrust.”  Instead, the president-
to-be articulated six concrete reform proposals: insisting on the core values of 
the judiciary, promoting trials by specialized courts, reinforcing the functions 
of oral argument in court, preventing contradictory court decisions, reducing 
the workload of judges to a reasonable range, and establishing the institution 
of the Constitutional complaint.128  The change in his opinions is intriguing. 
It could mean the president-to-be already “clarified the causes of public 
distrust” during his nomination process so that he could articulate the concrete 
proposals.  On the other hand, it could also suggest that the diagnosis of 
problems was “skipped,” because rapid, clear, and definite solutions to the 
problems were expected of the new president.129 
                                                 
125 About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7. 
126 Guan Wu-yuan, Tan si gai li nian xu zong li tui dong san shen zhi jia qiang fa zhi jiao yu (談司改
理念 許宗力：推動參審制 加強法治教育) [Talking About Judicial Reform Ideas, Nominee for President 
of the Judicial Yuan Xu Zong-li Expects to Promote Lay Participation and Improve Law-Related Education], 
LIAN HE BAO (聯合報) [UNITED NEWS], Sept. 1, 2016, https://money.udn.com/money/story/5641/1933179. 
127 Xu Zong-li, supra note 108. 
128 Press Release, Xu Zong-li (許宗力), Yuan zhang de si fa gai ge zhu zhang yi (院長的司法改革主
張  ( 一 )) [The View of The President of the Judicial Yuan on Judicial Reform, Part 1], 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/headmaster/judReform001.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
129 Id. (statement of Xu Zong-li) (“I think, we don’t have much time for . . . an empty talk in the ivory 
tower.”); see also FEELEY, supra note 1, at 192 (“It is tempting for reformers to cut through complexities, 
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2. Initiation and Implementation 
 
Feeley precisely describes the tension and conflicts between initiation 
and implementation: “a strategy that maximizes the likelihood of successful 
initiation—bold language, simplification, and expansive promises—is likely 
a strategy that undercuts implementation.”130  He also argues, “[p]roponents 
of reform have little incentive to evaluate; they know their ideas are good.  For 
many, success is defined by the ability to adopt, not implement, a new idea.”131  
 
Taiwan’s Judicial Reform Conference seems to reinforce the tension 
between initiators and implementers.  One of the defining characters of the 
Judicial Reform Conference is that half of the conference members are lay 
people, who are not involved with the legal profession.  While it is a good idea 
to enroll outsiders to initiate the change,132 it is also true that the difficulty in 
the stage of implementation is less perceivable to people unfamiliar with the 
practice of the system.  A member of the Judicial Reform Conference who is 
also a law professor described the Conference as “making a hundred wishes,” 
referencing the disorder and fragmented issues discussed in the Conference.133 
 
B. Analysis Based on Historical and Functional Perspectives 
 
Lay participation has been strongly supported by Taiwan’s judicial 
authority since 2011.  It has never been successfully passed into law, but the 
Judicial Yuan stopped advocating for lay participation in different versions as 
a major court reform.  From 2011 to 2016, the Judicial Yuan had relentlessly 
pushed the “Guan shen zhi” version of lay participation.  Although the attempt 
failed, and the supportive president and vice president of the Judicial Yuan 
both stepped down, the successor still embraces the idea of lay participation.  
In the Judicial Reform Conference, committee members deemed lay 
participation as “the most important issue of all.”134  It is also noteworthy that 
                                                 
point out enemies, and offer bold strategies . . . But these very strategies that facilitate innovation undercut 
implementation.”). 
130 See FEELEY, supra note 1, at 36. 
131 Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 
132 Id. at 196–97. 
133 司改放天燈，小心燎原難收拾 [Treating Judicial Reform as Flying Lanterns (Making Wishes 
Without Considering the Price) Can Be A Disaster], 聯 合 報 [UNITED NEWS], Apr. 17, 2017, 
https://udn.com/news/story/7338/2407455. 
134 Transcript, 第四分組第一次會議 [The First Division IV Judicial Reform Conference], 
http://justice.sayit.mysociety.org/%E7%B8%BD%E7%B5%B1%E5%BA%9C%E5%8F%B8%E6%B
3%95%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E5%9C%8B%E6%98%AF%E6%9C%83%E8%AD%B0%E7%AC%
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the mainstream discussion about lay participation is not whether Taiwan’s 
court trials should have lay participation, but which kind of lay participation 
is better for Taiwan.  Lay participation has almost become a default reform.135  
Regarding the untiring support and promotion of Taiwan’s government and 
the judicial authority for lay participation, an essential question to ask is: why 
is lay participation so attractive to legal reformers, especially the judicial 
authority?  This inquiry can be explored in both historical and functional 
contexts. 
 
C. Analysis in the Historical Context 
 
Historically speaking, the implementation of the reformed adversary 
system in 2002 is a remote but fundamental cause of the problem of public 
distrust, which leads to lay participation and other reform proposals.  As 
mentioned in Part II, the reformed adversary system aimed to distinguish 
between the duties of judges and prosecutors. 136   In so doing, reformers 
expected to establish an image that judges are fair, impartial, and only 
responsible for making the final decision in cases using evidence presented by 
the parties.  However, due to their reluctance to wholeheartedly embrace the 
passive role of judges, the lawmakers chose to keep the essence of the 
inquisitorial system within the new criminal court system.  Thus, judges are 
still empowered to actively investigate evidence.  The rule that judges shall ex 
officio investigate evidence related to justice maintenance and defendants’ 
rights further reinforces judges’ involvement and their decisive role in 
Taiwan’s criminal courts.137  If judges did not actively investigate evidence, 
and the evidence was considered to be related to justice maintenance or 
defendants’ rights by the appellate court, lower court decisions would be 
reversed.138  Few judges wish to run this risk.  Yet there is no restriction or 
punishment provided by the CCP to prohibit judges from investigating “too 
                                                 
AC%E5%9B%9B%E5%88%86%E7%B5%84/%E7%AC%AC%E5%9B%9B%E5%88%86%E7%B5%84
%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E6%AC%A1%E6%9C%83%E8%AD%B0 [hereinafter Transcript]. 
135 Video, 總統府司法改革國是會議第四分組第一次增開會議 [The First Division IV Judicial 
Reform Conference in the Presidential Palace], 中 華 民 國 律 師 公 會 全 國 聯 合 會 、 
財團法人民間司法改革基金會 [National Federation of Lawyers Association of the R.O.C., Found. for Civil 
Justice Reform], OFFICIAL WEBSITE JUD. REFORM CONF., https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/27 (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2017) (discussing whether “Taiwan should implement a jury trial system where all the facts 
are found by citizens or a system where judges and citizens decide the case together.”).  
136 See generally The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra 
note 14; CRIM. PROC. CODE. 
137 For details, see supra Section II.A.  
138 The Official Website of the Judicial Yuan about the Reformed Adversary System, supra note 14; 
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 256. 
232 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 1 
 
much” or from considering unimportant evidence.  Therefore, lower court 
judges have incentive to investigate evidence that seems obviously trivial to 
prevent missing any points that a higher court may later deem important.  In 
addition, many other mechanisms, such as discretionary power over criminal 
procedure selection, also contribute to the leading role of judges in court, as 
discussed in Part II.  Overall, judges are greatly empowered by the reformed 
adversary system, as well as by other mechanisms in Taiwan’s criminal 
procedure, making judges the very incarnation of Taiwan’s justice system. 
 
However, with great power comes even greater responsibility and 
expectations.  The parties, along with society as a whole, naturally expect that 
judges with such immense power can make decisions that will satisfy 
everyone, but this is beyond the capacity of the court.  For example, for the 
major child rape case resulting in the “White Rose Movement,” the public and 
media severely criticized the Highest Court decision, which asked the lower 
court to re-investigate “whether the offense was against the will of the six-
year-old victim.”139  However, while the public deemed this court decision 
ridiculous,140 many legal scholars argued that this decision was legitimate.141  
Scholars argued this court decision was made correctly, following the 
fundamental principle of “nullum crimen sine lege,”142 which requires that no 
person should face criminal punishment for doing things that were not 
criminalized by law.  As the Criminal Code requires the offense of rape to be 
“against the will” of the victim,143 this element must be investigated before 
the court makes a decision.144  That is to say, despite the harsh criticism, the 
                                                 
139  Protect Children, Remove Unqualified Judges—“White Rose Movement” Accusing Court for 
Leniently Treating Satyrs, supra note 92. 
140 Id. 
141 See, e.g., Lu Ying-jie (盧映潔), 「意不意願」很重要嗎?評高雄地方法院九十九年訴字第四二 
二號判決暨最高法院九十九年第七次刑庭決議 [Does Willingness Matter? Comments on Kaohsiung 
District Court 2010 suzi No.422 Decision and the Highest Court 2010 the 7th Criminal Conference Jue Yi], 
186 月旦法學雜誌 [TAIWAN L. REV.] 164 (2010); Cai Sheng-wei (蔡聖偉), 論「對幼童性交罪」與「強
制性交罪」.的關係評最高法院九十九年第七次刑事庭決議 [Discussion on the Relationship Between 
“Offense of Sexual Intercourse with Child” and “Offense of Rape” and Comments on the Highest Court 
2010 the 7th Criminal Conference Jue Yi] , 8 裁判時報 [COURT CASE TIMES] 65 (2011); Li Jia-wen (李佳
玟), 違反罪刑法定的正義 [The Justice in Violation of the Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege], 160 台
灣法學雜誌 [TAIWAN L.J.] 1 (2010). 
142 WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 875–77 (2012).  
143 中華民國刑法 [CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 221, para. 1 (“A person who by 
threats, violence, intimidation, inducing hypnosis, or other means against the will of a male or female and 
who has sexual intercourse with such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years 
but not more than ten years.”) (emphasis added) (Taiwan). 
144 CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 301, para. 1 (“If it cannot be proved that an accused has committed an offense 
or if his act is not punishable, a judgment of ‘Not Guilty’ shall be pronounced.”)  
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decision of the Highest Court was legitimate.  However, the members of the 
public who were outraged by the Highest Court decision did not accept this 
reasoning.  As a result, in 2011, when Taiwan’s president nominated one of 
the judges presiding over this case for the Justice of Taiwan’s Constitutional 
Court, public opinion from the fallout of the case required the judge to give 
up her nomination.145 
 
This example reveals the gap between the expectations of the people 
and restrictions on the criminal court as a legal institution.  The functions of 
criminal courts are in fact restricted by social reality and numerous legal rules.  
Nevertheless, these restrictions are hard for Taiwan’s people to perceive 
because judges seem to have omnipotent power to dictate criminal 
proceedings.  This omnipotent image of judges is probably the last thing that 
the advocates of the reformed adversary system would like to see.  However, 
in the historical context, it is clear how Taiwan’s previous innovation of the 
reformed adversary system has contributed to this consequence.  In a word, 
the criminal court is often expected to achieve goals beyond its capacity, and 
judges are deemed accountable for all flaws and failures of the criminal justice 
system.  Under these circumstances, the public’s dissatisfaction and distrust 
of courts and judges is inevitably reinforced.  As a consequence, judges are 
blamed for falling short of expectations and become the target of court reform.  
In response to the public distrust of judges, lay participation appears to be a 





D. Analysis in the Functional Context 
 
Functionally speaking, lay participation has most likely been attractive 
to the public because it seems like the most intuitive and simple solution to 
the crisis of confidence.  According to the Judicial Yuan, the first reason for 
promoting the “Guan shen zhi” version of lay participation was that it could 
“increase the transparency of the judiciary and improve the trust of people in 
                                                 
144 President under Fire after Nominating Controversial Judge for Constitutional Court, FORMOSA 
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2011, 
http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=5EDF8863357587C6E1D4318BAC920441. 
145 Id.  
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courts.”146  Taiwan’s judicial authority and advocates of lay participation 
generally believe that the deep-seated antipathy against judges is mainly 
because the public lacks a correct understanding of court functions in practice.  
If they can “add seats for people” in the courtroom, the advocates of lay 
participation believe it will improve the transparency and trust in the court and 
will facilitate a better understanding of the process.147 
 
The intention of reformers explains why Taiwan’s judicial authority 
strongly promoted the “Guan shen zhi” as a system where lay people cannot 
vote for court decisions.  Now that the problem of distrust is diagnosed by the 
judicial authority as a “lack of understanding of courts and judges,” the 
solution then can be as simple as making ordinary people sit in the court 
through the entire proceedings.  A widely held belief of the advocates of the 
“Guan shen zhi” is that in so doing, even without being authorized to make 
decisions, ordinary people can learn how courts and judges function so that 
misunderstandings can be clarified.  With an enhanced understanding of court 
proceedings, advocates expect that people will comprehend the meaning of 
trial, sympathize with court decisions, and recover their confidence in the 
judicial system.148  Therefore, even though the former president of the Judicial 
Yuan failed to pass the “Guan shen zhi” version of lay participation into law, 
his current successor still expects other patterns of lay participation can help 
the judicial system win back the trust of people.149 
 
                                                 
146 The other two reasons were that “the diverse composition of courts can make court decisions close 
to the will of people” and “lay participation can work as a means of law-related education to improve the 
understanding of judicial system.” See Lay Participation in Criminal Trials, supra note 100. 
147 Lin Jun-yi (林俊益), Ren min guan shen zhi zhi jian gou yi (人民觀審制之建構（一）) [The 
Construction of Guan Shen Zhi, Chapter One], 58 軍法專刊 [MARTIAL L. J.] 23 (2012). 
148 The diagnosis of problems and solutions thereof is based on an idea of “familiarity breeds respect,” 
the opposite to the familiar folk maxim “familiarity breeds contempt.” There are scholars advocating this 
idea and believing that the generally so-called “courtwatch” program can foster citizens’ support for the court 
system by involving citizens in court operations. See, e.g., Candace McCoy & Galma Jahic, Familiarity 
Breeds Respect: Organizing and Studying a Courtwatch, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 61 (2006); However, whether 
familiarity will breed respect or contempt in Taiwan is an empirical question. It is noteworthy that an 
empirical study of the public attitudes toward the judicial system in Taiwan in 2011 showed that people who 
had court experience had even lower trust than those who had not, which is against the assumption that 
“familiarity breeds respect.” See Huang Kuo-Chang et al. (黃國昌等), Explaining Public Attitudes toward 
the Judicial System: The Case of Taiwan, 1 台灣政治學看刊 [TAIWANESE POL. SCI. REV.] 21 (2017), 
available at http://idv.sinica.edu.tw/kongpin/3.pdf. 
149 Lin He-ming (林河名), Xu zong li tan si gai ren min san shen ke tao lun ( 許談司改：「人民參審
可討論」) [The Nominee for President of the Judicial Yuan Xu Zong-li Talking about Court Reform: A 
Consideration of Lay Participation], LIAN HE BAO ( 聯 合 報 ) [UNITED NEWS], Sept. 2, 2016, 
https://udn.com/news/story/9939/1935012. 
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In addition, the failure of other efforts at regaining the trust of the 
people is another functional reason that the judicial authority has firmly 
upheld the idea of lay participation.  From 2010 to 2016, except for 
successfully passing the proposed lay participation of “Guan shen zhi” into 
law, the judicial authority had tried everything it could to win back the public 
trust.  As for the reform on criminal courts, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
had been amended ten times, changing 66 articles.  The judicial reform also 
expanded to almost all areas of the judiciary, including reform of civil courts 
and administrative courts, establishment of the Judicial Evaluation 
Committee, a change in personnel system, implementation of the Code of 
Conduct for Judges, and so on.150  These innovations, unfortunately, did not 
work to regain the confidence of people in the court system.  Since 2010, 
nationwide surveys show more than 75% of people doubt the fairness and 
impartiality of judges in making decisions.151  Indeed, in 2015, the nationwide 
survey showed that 85% of Taiwan’s people did not trust judges, a historically 
high number.152  In 2016, another survey showed that judges were the least 
trusted profession in Taiwan. 153   In 2017, in a survey about the public 
impression on Taiwan’s officials, judges were again ranked the least trusted 
officials in Taiwan.154  Given that so many other reforms didn’t re-establish 
the confidence in the court system, lay participation is perhaps the last option 
available to the judicial authority for regaining trust. 
 
VI.   A FRAGMENTED GOAL OF COURT REFORM 
 
A. “Responding to Expectations of the People”  
 
From the above analyses, it is clear that lay participation is not a goal 
in its own right of Taiwan’s court reform.  Rather, lay participation is the 
                                                 
150 JUDICIAL YUAN (司法院), Fa guan ren shi gai ge cheng xiao ping gu wei yuan hui (法官人事改革
成 效 評 估 委 員 會 ) [Judicial Evaluation Committee], 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/revolution/judReform10.asp (last visited May 1, 2017) (introducing Taiwan’s 
judicial reform policies implemented from 2011–2016). 
151 NATIONAL CHUNG CHENG UNIVERSITY CRIME RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 98. 
152 Id. 
153 Xiong Yi-xi, Bao gao xiao ying zong tong fa guan xin ren du diao che wei si fa gai ge bu neng deng 
(報告小英總統：法官信任度吊車尾 司法改革不能等) [Report to President Tsai: Judges Are The Least 
Trusted Profession. Judicial Reform Can’t Wait], TIAN XIA ZA ZHI (天下雜誌) [COMMONWEALTH MAG.] 
(May 24, 2016), http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5076477. 
154 Zhong Li-hua, Ren min gong pu hao gan du jing cha di yi fa guan jing pei mo zuo (人民公僕好感
度警察第一 法官敬陪末座) [As for Favorable Impression on Officials, Police Ranked Greatest and Judges 
Ranked Least], ZI YOU SHI BAO ( 自 由 時 報 ) [LIBERTY TIMES], Apr. 24, 2017, 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2045776. 
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means to a particular objective: responding to the expectations of ordinary 
people.  As articulated in the statement of the National Affairs Conference on 
Judicial Reform, the objectives of reform are building a judicial system 
belonging to the people, responding to the expectations of the people, and 
being trusted by the people.155  If we read these objectives carefully, we may 
find that building a judicial system belonging to the people and being trusted 
by the people are regarded as the achievements of a successful reform, rather 
than as substantive means to reform.  Conversely, responding to the 
expectations of the people is the basis for taking action.  Responding to the 
expectations of the people seems to be a concrete goal for legal reform 
because the expectations of the people are concrete and some of them are 
seemingly achievable.  
 
In many proposed or implemented court reforms in Taiwan, we can see 
that responding to the expectations of the people has been taken as the policy 
goal of Taiwan’s court reform.  For example, in the first meeting of the 
preparatory conference for launching the National Affairs Conference on 
Judicial Reform, Taiwan’s President Tsai In-wen delivered an opening speech 
focusing on the expectations of the people: 
 
I know that Taiwan’s people have very high expectation of court 
reform.  People expect that the judiciary can be more impartial. 
No “dinosaur judges.”  No “life or death depends on wealth.”  
People also expect the judiciary can be more efficient, so that 
their normal life won’t be affected by the lengthy proceedings.156 
 
President Tsai’s speech revealed the overall objective of Taiwan’s 
ongoing court reform: responding to the expectations of the people.   If 
responding to the expectations of the people is the core of reform, no wonder 
lay participation is considered “the most important of all” in the Judicial 
Reform Conference.157  After all, lay participation itself is a device designed 
for incorporating the opinions of ordinary people in court decisions and 
increasing public trust in the judiciary. 158   That is, by incorporating the 
                                                 
155 See About the National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform, supra note 7. 
156 See The First Preparation Committee for the Presidential National Affairs Conference on Judicial 
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157 See Transcript, supra note 134. 
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Univ. Press ed., 2012). (“Professional judges and state prosecutors, on the other hand, regarded lay 
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opinions of lay people in particular cases, court decisions can be deemed, in a 
sense, the fulfillment of “responding to the expectations of the people.” 
 
B. Pitfalls of the Fragmented Goal  
 
However, is responding to the expectations of the people an appropriate 
goal of Taiwan’s court reform?  It may be quite doubtful.  First of all, a policy 
goal has to be clear and directive; it must be clear enough that everyone 
involved in implementing it has the same understanding of what it is, and it 
must be able to direct all involved efforts towards that end.  The idea of 
responding to the expectations of the people, however, is neither clear nor 
directive.  A court system that can respond to the expectations of the people 
sounds very attractive, but it is almost impossible to define what expectations 
of the people means in this context. Each person has his or her own likes and 
dislikes.  One person’s meat may be another person’s poison.  In any legal 
contest, when a party wins the case, entirely or partly, the other party loses.  
Trials are, after all, a zero sum game.  If responding to expectations is difficult 
to achieve in a single case, how can it be achieved in the far more complex 
context of society as a whole? 
 
Some may argue that the public may share some common expectations, 
and the meaning of responding to the expectations of the people is simply to 
meet these common expectations.159  Some expectations are general.  For 
example, perhaps all people expect an impartial, fair, and speedy trial, a more 
transparent court, and a court that protects human rights.  Nevertheless, even 
these common goals suffer from their lack of clear definition.  Judges may 
believe they are fair and impartial, but at least one party (more often, both 
parties) feels otherwise.  A court may spend three months finishing the trial 
of a complex case without unnecessary delay, but the victim and the public 
may still accuse the court of inertia.  Responding to the expectations of the 
people is actually an abstract notion, which fails to provide a clear definition 
for what expectations are to be achieved. 
 
                                                 
159 Describing that the public may share common expectations of the judicial system and judicial reform, 
therefore, has to consider these common expectations. See, e.g., Brian L. Kennedy, Taiwan’s Criminal-
Justice System: Clash of Cultures, TAIWAN TODAY, Apr. 1, 2003, 
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expectations into account.”). 
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More importantly, expectations of individuals may conflict with each 
other.  For example, a fair and impartial trial may require a complete and 
detailed investigation of evidence, which takes a lot of time to the detriment 
of having a speedy trial.  A transparent court may be expected to provide as 
much information as possible to the public, which is at the expense of the 
privacy of the litigants.  All of these values comprising various expectations 
of the people are important, but none of them is preeminent.  When these 
values conflict with each other, the conflict leads to a compromise of some 
values, which can give the appearance that the court failed to meet its 
objective.  That is why an appropriate policy goal of court reform must be 
directive, so that the values with potential conflicts may be decided on the 
basis of a higher policy objective.  
 
Without a clearly-defined and directive policy objective, the ongoing 
Judicial Reform Conference may make the balance between crucial values 
worse, not better.  For example, one of the six major issues that the current 
president of the Judicial Yuan emphasizes regarding court reform is to 
transform the court into one with greater specialization.160  According to the 
president, courts should be specialized on topics, such as food safety, 
electronic information, environmental protection, architecture, medical 
treatment, and so on.161  This reform may be achieved by means of training 
judges, establishing specialty courts, and introducing experts of diverse 
specialties into the court system.  But how does this reform impact lay 
participation, which is “the most important of all” of the current court 
reforms?162  A specialized court is helpful for solving cases more accurately 
and professionally, but it can also make the trial more complex and difficult 
to comprehend for lay judges.  Given this conflict, which important value of 
reform should be comprised?  The policy goal of Taiwan’s court reform, 
responding to the expectations of the people, cannot provide a solution to the 
value conflicts, because lay participation and more professional courts are 
both expectations of the people.  The question at issue is not which value is 
more significant than the other, but instead, what policy goal of court reforms 
must be directive in order to guide a solution to these dilemmas?  
Unfortunately, responding to the expectations of the people is not up to this 
task.  
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In summary, responding to the expectations of the people may be a 
good political slogan, but it is not a suitable policy goal for court reform.  
When applying a goal that is intrinsically fragmented, it will, at best, cause 
the effort to be made in vain.  At worst, it will have a counterproductive result.  
All of these efforts towards the fragmented goal of responding to the 
expectations of the people may very possibly clash with each other and offset 
the important values of each other. 
 
VII.   CONCLUSION: WHY DO SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL? 
 
Borrowing the subtitle of Feeley’s masterpiece “Court Reform on Trial: 
Why Simple Solutions Fail,” this section will sum up the thesis by recapping 
the nature of Taiwan’s criminal court system and the feature of its current 
court reform.  Distinct from the fragmented American criminal court, 
Taiwan’s criminal court is a not-fragmented system.  With hierarchical control 
in prosecutorial rulings and central administration of judicial decision-
making, Taiwan’s court system can be deemed a relatively centralized and 
bureaucratic organization.  In this system, the role of judges is designed to be 
that of the leading character in resolving all disagreements between parties 
and conflicts of interest.  At the same time, Taiwan’s judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys are obligated to pursue common objectives, including 
maintaining justice and discovering facts that are critical to the interest of the 
accused.  Since Taiwan’s criminal court system is not-fragmented, it seems to 
be able to avoid the pitfalls inherent in a fragmented justice system like the 
American system. 
 
However, this not-fragmented court system has faced a serious crisis of 
confidence.  The same mechanisms in criminal procedure that contribute to a 
not-fragmented court system also result in over-expectations of the people 
about what courts can do.  Due to controversial court decisions and corruption 
scandals involving judges since 2010, more than 75% of Taiwanese people 
distrust judges since 2010.163  After many failed attempts gain back trust, the 
government and the judicial authority eventually diagnosed the problem as 
generalized dissatisfaction and disappointment in the judiciary.  The current 
president of Taiwan believes that responding to the expectations of the people 
is the recipe for success.  To achieve this goal, the National Affairs 
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Conference on Judicial Reform is taking place to discuss concrete policies and 
details. 
 
Although the solution of responding to the expectations of the people 
appears to be simple and intuitive, the cause of distrust is inaccurately or 
incorrectly diagnosed, and the solution to distrust is intrinsically fragmented.  
Derived from its fragmented nature, the reform goal of responding to the 
expectations of the people is unclear, over generalized, and not directive.  In 
Taiwan’s not-fragmented court system, pursuing a fragmented goal in court 
reform will, at best, lead to efforts that are in vain; often, it may lead to a 
counterproductive result. 
 
However, the above findings and perspectives of this Article must be 
interpreted with caution.  By saying that the problem of public distrust was 
diagnosed inaccurately and the solution was constructed inappropriately, this 
Article does not mean to say that lay participation and other planned changes 
will inevitably fail.  Instead, each planned change may work out in its own 
right.  Nevertheless, it is exactly these planned changes that, if successful, may 
clash with each other, offset the effects of each other, and lead to a 
counterproductive result. 
 
